The SALT II treaty banned new missile programs (a new missile, defined as a missile whose key parameter is 5% better than currently deployed missiles), forcing both sides to restrict the development and construction of their new types of strategic missiles, such as . B the development of additional ICBM fixed launchers. Similarly, this agreement would limit the number of MIRVed ballistic and long-range missiles to 1,320. [10] However, the United States maintained its most important programs such as the Trident missile, as well as the cruise missiles that President Jimmy Carter wanted to use as the main defensive weapon because they were too slow to have a first-strike capability. In return, the USSR could only keep 308 of its SS-18 launchers called "heavy ICBMs". On the 27th. In May, President Reagan announced that the United States would no longer adhere to treaty boundaries. The president said that the USSR was not fulfilling its political commitment to comply with the provisions of the treaty and was not showing its willingness to conclude new arms reduction agreements. He went on to say that the United States would base its decisions on its strategic force structure on the nature and extent of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on the standards contained in the SALT structure. He explained that the US would not use more SNDVs or strategic ballistic missile warheads than the USSR to protect strategic deterrence.
An agreement to limit strategic launchers was signed on 18 September. It was signed by Leonid Brezhnev and Carter during a ceremony in the Redoubtnsaal of the Imperial Hofburg. [11] Negotiations began in Helsinki, Finland, in November 1969. [1] SALT I led to the Ballistic Missile Defense Treaty and an interim agreement between the two countries. Although SALT II led to an agreement in 1979, the U.S. Senate decided not to ratify the treaty in response to the Soviet war in Afghanistan that took place later that year. The Soviet legislature did not ratify it either. The agreement expired on 31 December 1985 and has not been renewed. Nixon was proud that, through his diplomatic skills, he reached an agreement that his predecessors could not reach. Nixon and Kissinger planned to combine arms control with détente and solve other pressing problems through what Nixon called "liaison." David Tal argues: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union aimed at restricting the production of strategic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons.
The first agreements, known as SALT I and SALT II, were signed by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1972 and 1979, respectively, and aimed to limit the arms race on strategic ballistic missiles (long-range or intercontinental) armed with nuclear weapons. First proposed by U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967, the two superpowers agreed in the summer of 1968 on strategic arms control talks, and comprehensive negotiations began in November 1969. At the Vladivostok Summit in November 1974, Ford and Brezhnev agreed on the basic framework for a SALT II agreement. This included a limit of 2,400 for strategic nuclear launchers (ICBM, SLBM and heavy bombers) on each side; a limit of 1,320 for MIRV systems; the ban on new ground-based ICBM launchers; and limits to the use of new types of strategic offensive weapons. Until 31 December 1985; Unless the treaty is replaced earlier by an agreement that further restricts strategic offensive weapons A major breakthrough for this agreement took place at the Vladivostok Summit in November 1974, when President Gerald Ford and Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev reached agreement on the basic framework of the SALT II agreement. The elements of this agreement were declared to enter into force until 1985. The talks culminated in START, or Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, which included START I (a 1991 agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union) and START II (a 1993 agreement between the United States and Russia that was never ratified by the United States), both of which proposed restrictions on multiple warhead capabilities and other restrictions on the number of nuclear weapons on both sides. A successor to START I, New START, was proposed and finally ratified in February 2011. Mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles are not covered.
The Soviet Union considered that it should not be frozen, since neither side had such systems; It also spoke out against banning them in a future comprehensive agreement. The United States considered that they should be banned because of the verification difficulties they caused. In an official statement, the U.S. delegation said the U.S. would consider the use of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles during the term of the agreement to be inconsistent with its objectives. After the failure of the first attempts to reach a comprehensive agreement, the Soviets tried to limit negotiations to missile defense systems, claiming that restrictions on offensive systems should be postponed. The U.S. position was that limiting ABM systems would be incompatible with SALT`s core objectives, but allowing for the unrestricted growth of offensive weapons, and that it was important to at least begin to limit offensive systems. A long stalemate on this issue was eventually overcome by exchanges at the highest levels of the two governments. On May 20, 1971, Washington and Moscow announced that an agreement had been reached to focus on a permanent treaty to limit ABM systems, but at the same time to elaborate certain restrictions on offensive systems and continue negotiations on a more comprehensive and long-term agreement on them. The link between restrictions on strategic weapons and open issues such as the Middle East, Berlin and, above all, Vietnam became central to Nixon and Kissinger`s policy of détente. Using connections, they hoped to change the nature and course of U.S.
foreign policy, including U.S. nuclear disarmament and arms control policies, and separate it from those practiced by Nixon`s predecessors. They also intended to make U.S. arms control policy part of the détente by binding it. [...] Its liaison policy had indeed failed. It failed mainly because it was based on erroneous assumptions and false premises, the most important of which was that the Soviet Union wanted much more of a strategic arms limitation agreement than the United States. [9] This agreement paved the way for further discussions on international cooperation and nuclear arms control, as seen both in the SALT II Treaty and at the 1973 Washington Summit. Official text: media.nti.org/documents/salt_1.pdf Two initial disagreements were obstacles. Soviet representatives tried to define any American or Soviet weapons system capable of reaching the territory of the other side as "strategic" – that is, negotiable in SALT. This would have included US "forward-facing systems", mainly short- or medium-range bombers stationed on aircraft carriers or in Europe, but it would have excluded, for example, Soviet intermediate-range missiles targeting Western Europe.
The United States found that the weapons to be traded in SALT included intercontinental systems. Its forward forces were used to counter Soviet intermediate-range missiles and aircraft targeting U.S. allies. Accepting the Soviet approach would have undermined the Alliance`s obligations. Given the many asymmetries in the strengths of both countries, the imposition of equivalent restrictions required quite complex and precise provisions. At the time of signing, the United States had 1,054 operational ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, none of which were under construction; The Soviet Union had about 1,618 operational and under construction. The launchers under construction could be completed. Neither side would start building other fixed ground-based ICBM launchers during the terms of the deal – which in fact also excludes the relocation of existing launchers.
Launchers for light or older iCBMs cannot be converted to launchers for modern heavy ICBMs. This prevents the Soviet Union from replacing older missiles with missiles such as the SS-9, which was the largest and most powerful missile in the Soviet inventory in 1972 and was of particular concern to the United States. The United States reiterated its January 1984 accusation that the USSR had violated certain provisions of the Treaty. In June, President Reagan reaffirmed that it was in the interest of the United States to maintain a temporary framework of mutual restraint with the USSR and stated that the United States would continue to refrain from undermining existing strategic arms agreements as long as the USSR showed similar restraint and actively pursued arms reduction agreements within the framework of the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks (NST). The USSR also repeated its accusations of January 1984 that the United States had violated certain provisions of the treaty. Both agreements were accompanied by a series of "agreed statements" adopted and initialled by the heads of delegation. When the two agreements were submitted to the US Congress, they were also accompanied by consensual agreements and unilateral declarations during the negotiations. These should clarify specific provisions of the agreements or parts of the negotiating protocol.
Through diplomatic channels in Washington and Moscow, talks with Soviet representatives at the ENDC, and exchanges at the highest level of the two governments, the United States continued to push for a Soviet commitment to discuss strategic arms limits. But it was not until the following year that evidence of a Soviet reassessment of their position emerged. The 1. In July 1968, at the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, President Johnson announced that an agreement had been reached with the Soviet Union to begin talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems and ballistic missile defence. .
